Nicholas Rescher "Peirce and the Economy of Research" Philosophy of Science Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 1976), pp. 71-98 https://www.jstor.org/stable/187336
"Proposals for hypotheses inundate us in an over-whelming flood, while the process of verification to which each one must be subjected before it can count as at all an item, even of likely knowledge, is so very costly in time, energy, and money-and consequently in ideas which might have been had for that time energy, and money, that Economy would override every other consideration even if there were any other serious considerations. In fact there are no others."
" To this idea of the economy of research-of cost-benefit analysis in inductive inquiry and reasoning-Peirce gave as central a placе in his methodology of science as words can manage to assign.6 Yet
no other part of this great man's philosophizing has fallen on stonier ground."
Вот из выводов:
Even in a very rudimentary form, the economic perspective emphasized by Peirce can straightforwardly resolve some of the key disputed issues in the recent theory of inductive reasoning, including problems regarding Carnap's requirement of total evidence, Hempel's paradox of the ravens, Goodman's grue paradox, the concept of simplicity-preference, and some of the key issues controverted between Popper and his opponents. It is interesting and significant to note that a common thread runs through many of the major controversial points in the recent theory of inductive reasoning. Time and again, the theoreticians us one sort of story where common sense says something quite different. And so there arises a to-and-fro of great length with such issues as grue versus blue or black ravens versus white shoes, issues where the whole tradition of ordinary practice tells us that there is no realistic occasion for worry. It now becomes clear why the theoreticians encounter perplexity where others do not. For they have all too commonly left out of consideration one of the very central factors of this (and any other) enterprise-the economic element.
In consequence, a gap has opened up between the theoreticians' ideas as to how matters should stand in the abstract logic of things, and the ordinary practitioner's sense of the natural way to go at it. Recourse to a consideration of the economic aspect of inductive practice can neatly close this gap in many cases. Peirce had a clearer vision here than many of his successors"
Пересказываю основную идею своими словами. Пирс - основоположник американской философии, так называемого учения прагматизма. Применительно к теории познания, Пирс рассматривал научное предприятие как задачу линейного программирования, когда гипотезы можно проверять при помощи тех или иных экспериментов. При этом одни эксперементы - более важные, другие - менее. Одни эксперимeнты более дорогие, другие - менее. С точки зрения теоретика и с точки зрения практика это приводит к двум совершенно разным задачам оптимизации. Разрыв между этими двумя проблемами оптимизации и представляет собой главный эпистемологический разрыв между теорией и практикой. И разрешить его можно, если ввести деньги в методологию научного познания, то есть оценивать естественные нaуки с точки зрения денег!
Вот где корень зла, вау!